What is the threat?
An ATM cash-out attack is an elaborate and choreographed attack in which criminals breach a bank or payment card processor and manipulate fraud detection controls as well as alter customer accounts so there are no limits to withdraw money from numerous ATMs in a short period of time.
Criminals often manipulate balances and withdrawal limits to allow ATM withdrawals until ATM machines are empty of cash.
How do ATM cash-out attacks work?
An ATM cash-out attack requires careful planning and execution. Often, the criminal enterprise gains remote access to a card management system to alter the fraud prevention controls such as withdrawal limits or PIN number of compromised cardholder accounts. This is commonly done by inserting malware via phishing or social engineering methods into a financial institution or payment processor’s systems.
The criminal enterprise then can create new accounts or use compromised existing accounts and/or distribute compromised debit/credit cards to a group of people who make withdrawals at ATMs in a coordinated manner.
With control of the card management system, criminals can manipulate balances and withdrawal limits to allow ATM withdrawals until ATM machines are empty of cash.
These attacks usually do not exploit vulnerabilities in the ATM itself. The ATM is used to withdraw cash after vulnerabilities in the card issuers authorization system have been exploited.
Who is most at risk?
Financial institutions, and payment processors are most at financial risk and likely to be the target of these large-scale, coordinated attacks. These institutions stand to potentially lose millions of dollars in a very short time period and can have exposure in multiple regions around the world as the result of this highly organized, well-orchestrated criminal attack.
What are some detection best practices?
- Velocity monitoring of underlying accounts and volume
- 24/7 monitoring capabilities including File Integrity Monitoring Systems (FIMs)
- Reporting system that sounds the alarm immediately when suspicious activity is identified
- Development and practice of an incident response management system
- Check for unexpected traffic sources (e.g. IP addresses)
- Look for unauthorized execution of network tools.
What are some prevention best practices?
- Strong access controls to your systems and identification of third-party risks
- Employee monitoring systems to guard against an “inside job”
- Continuous phishing training for employees
- Multi-factor authentication
- Strong password management
- Require layers of authentication/approval for remote changes to account balances and transaction limits
- Implementation of required security patches in a timely manner (ASAP)
- Regular penetration testing
- Frequent reviews of access control mechanisms and access privileges
- Strict separation of roles that have privileged access to ensure no one user ID can perform sensitive functions
- Installation of file integrity monitoring software that can also serve as a detection mechanism
- Strict adherence to the entire PCI DSS.
Based on responses from 1,000 U.S. cardholders who are familiar with contactless credit/debit card or “tap and pay” technology, a new Entrust Datacard survey reveals that 75% of U.S.-based payment cardholders prefer contactless cards as their primary payment method over chip insert, card swipe, mobile pay and cash.
Contactless cards are here to stay
According to the survey’s results, 83% of respondents believe contactless cards are here to stay and 61% believe it’s at least somewhat of a priority to have a contactless feature on their credit or debit card. This prioritization is most prominent among Gen Z, Millennials and Gen X when compared to Baby Boomers.
In fact, 20% of Boomers reported they never use the contactless payment feature on their debit or credit card when making a purchase while this percentage is less than 10% for each of the other respective generations.
However, while contactless cards are gaining momentum with many in the U.S., the majority of consumers are still unaware of their card replacement options should they not have a contactless chip, or the card is lost or stolen.
Time for banks to educate their customers
With respondents citing sanitation (70%) and speed (67%) as benefits of contactless cards, now is the opportune time for banks to educate their customers on the benefits of replacing their card with a contactless card from their bank.
“As many Americans deal with financial setbacks and heightened concerns around health and safety in the face of COVID-19, the value we are placing on contactless payments has increased markedly,” said Tony Ball, senior vice president for instant payment card issuance at Entrust Datacard.
“Consumers want the ability to shop at their convenience, but also want to minimize personal contact with point of sale devices. Contactless cards are rising in popularity as a result.”
For faster card replacement, visiting a branch is best
Out of the 71% of respondents who cited losing their payment card, 84% notified their bank via phone while only 22% visited a physical bank branch in hopes of getting a replacement card right away.
73% of respondents who notified the bank by phone had to wait 1-7 days for a new card to be delivered by mail. By contrast, 58% of respondents who notified the bank at the branch got a new card instantly.
Instant payment card issuance unawareness
Despite contactless cards growing in popularity, many consumers are unaware of whether or not their banks or credit unions offer instant issuance or replacement of contactless debit or credit cards.
According to the results, 64% of respondents said their banks offer instant card issuance and replacement (63%), yet around one-fourth were unsure of whether their bank offered these options (27% and 24%, respectively) suggesting both an education and marketing opportunity for banks on card issuance solutions.
Your payment card information got stolen but you don’t know how, when and where? Maybe you shopped on one of the 570 webshops compromised by the Keeper Magecart group (aka Magecart Group 8) since April 1, 2017.
Magecart Group 8’s modus operandi and targets
The list of the online shops hit by the criminals has been released by researchers from Gemini Advisory, who managed to compile it after gaining access to the group’s dedicated attack server that hosts both the malicious payload and the exfiltrated data stolen from victim sites.
“Analysis revealed that the Keeper group includes an interconnected network of 64 attacker domains used to deliver malicious JS payloads and 73 exfiltration domains used to receive stolen payment cards data from victim domains.
Their research also revealed that:
- Over 85% of the victim sites operated on the Magento CMS, 5% WordPress, and 4% Sophify
- The group tried to disguise its malicious attacker domains as legitimate services (e.g., the attacker domain closetlondon[.]org attempted to imitate closetlondon.com) and tried to imitate popular website plugins and payment gateways
- The majority of victim e-commerce sites was hosted in the U.S., followed by the U.K., the Netherlands, France, India, etc.
“The 570 victim e-commerce sites were made up of small to medium-sized merchants and were scattered across 55 different countries,” the researchers shared.
“Victims with the top Alexa Global Ranking received anywhere from 500,000 to over one million visitors each month and were responsible for selling electronics, clothing, jewelry, custom promotional products, and liquor.”
The attackers likely targeted small and medium-sized retailers because they are less likely to have a dedicated IT security team, to implement CMS and plugin patches promptly, and to have security measures in place and attack detection capabilities.
The profitability of Magecart attacks
The researchers estimated that the group may have generated over $7 million USD from selling compromised payment cards between 2017 and today.
“With revenue likely exceeding $7 million and increased cybercriminal interest in CNP [Card Not Present] data during the COVID-19 quarantine measures across the world, this group’s market niche appears to be secure and profitable,” they noted, and said that they expect the group to continue launching increasingly sophisticated attacks against online merchants across the world.
For the end users – i.e., the online shoppers – it’s all the same and, unfortunately, there is little they can do to protect themselves against the threat of getting their payment card info skimmed.
Magecart attackers have compromised web shops belonging to large retail chains Claire’s and Intersport and equipped them with payment card skimmers.
The compromise of Claire’s online store and that of its sister brand Icing has been flagged by Sansec researchers.
The skimmer was served from a domain made to look like it might belong to the company (claires-assets.com), and it was added to the two online stores between April 25th and 30th.
“The malware was added to the (otherwise legitimate) app.min.js file. This file is hosted on the store servers, so there is no “Supply Chain Attack” involved, and attackers have actually gained write access to the store code,” the researchers pointed out.
“The skimmer attaches to the submit button of the checkout form. Upon clicking, the full ‘Demandware Checkout Form’ is grabbed, serialized and base64 encoded. A temporary image is added to the DOM with the __preloader identifier. The image is located on the server as controlled by the attacker. Because all of the customer submitted data is appended to the image address, the attacker now has received the full payload. Immediately, the image element is removed.”
How the attackers managed to compromise the web shops is still unknown, but they started planning the attack a month before actually executing it. In fact, they registered the malicious domain a day after Claire’s announced that they will be temporarily close all of their brick and mortar stores due to COVID-19.
ESET researchers have pointed out the compromise of Intersport’s web store and said that the company fixed the issue within several hours of ESET letting them know.
Sansec researchers say that an initial hack happened on Apr 30th and then another one on May 14th:
Intersport stores got hacked on Apr 30th, cleaned on May 3rd, then hacked again on May 14th. pic.twitter.com/RabcjPzzWd
— Sansec (@sansecio) June 15, 2020
Only the localized Intersport web shops serving customers from the Balkans region have been compromised.
It is still unknown how long the skimmers went unnoticed.
None of the compromised web shops sport a prominent notification about the breach and payment card info theft. Claire’s notified the payment card networks and law enforcement, and let’s hope they will contact affected customers directly once they determine the extent of the compromise and theft.
Companies should have protections in place to notice this and other types of breaches soon after they happen, but unfortunately many don’t.
If you’re paying for your purchases with payment cards – whether online or in physical stores – you should regularly check your account statements for unauthorized charges and report them quickly.
US convenience store Wawa said on Thursday that it recently discovered malware that skimmed customers’ payment card data at just about all of its 850 stores.
The infection began rolling out to the store’s payment-processing system on March 4 and wasn’t discovered until December 10, an advisory published on the company’s website said. It took two more days for the malware to be fully contained. Most locations’ point-of-sale systems were affected by April 22, 2019, although the advisory said some locations may not have been affected at all.
The malware collected payment card numbers, expiration dates, and cardholder names from payment cards used at “potentially all Wawa in-store payment terminals and fuel dispensers.” The advisory didn’t say how many customers or cards were affected. The malware didn’t access debit card PINs, credit card CVV2 numbers, or driver license data used to verify age-restricted purchases. Information processed by in-store ATMs was also not affected. The company has hired an outside forensics firm to investigate the infection.
Thursday’s disclosure came after Visa issued two security alerts—one in November and another this month—warning of payment-card-skimming malware at North American gasoline pumps. Card readers at self-service fuel pumps are particularly vulnerable to skimming because they continue to read payment data from cards’ magnetic stripes rather than card chips, which are much less susceptible to skimmers.
In the November advisory, Visa officials wrote:
The recent attacks are attributed to two sophisticated criminal groups with a history of large-scale, successful compromises against merchants in various industries. The groups gain access to the targeted merchant’s network, move laterally within the network using malware toolsets, and ultimately target the merchant’s POS environment to scrape payment card data. The groups also have close ties with the cybercrime underground and are able to easily monetize the accounts obtained in these attacks by selling the accounts to the top tier cybercrime underground carding shops.
The December advisory said that two of three attacks bore the hallmarks of Fin8, an organized cybercrime group that has targeted retailers since 2016. There’s no indication the Wawa infections have any connection to the ones in the Visa advisories.
People who have used payment cards at a Wawa location should pay close attention to billing statements over the past eight months. It’s always a good idea to regularly review credit reports as well. Wawa said it will provide one year of identity-theft protection and credit monitoring from credit-reporting service Experian at no charge. Thursday’s disclosure lists other steps card holders can take.