rEvil

Security Blueprints of Many Companies Leaked in Hack of Swedish Firm Gunnebo

In March 2020, KrebsOnSecurity alerted Swedish security giant Gunnebo Group that hackers had broken into its network and sold the access to a criminal group which specializes in deploying ransomware. In August, Gunnebo said it had successfully thwarted a ransomware attack, but this week it emerged that the intruders stole and published online tens of thousands of sensitive documents — including schematics of client bank vaults and surveillance systems.

The Gunnebo Group is a Swedish multinational company that provides physical security to a variety of customers globally, including banks, government agencies, airports, casinos, jewelry stores, tax agencies and even nuclear power plants. The company has operations in 25 countries, more than 4,000 employees, and billions in revenue annually.

Acting on a tip from Milwaukee, Wis.-based cyber intelligence firm Hold Security, KrebsOnSecurity in March told Gunnebo about a financial transaction between a malicious hacker and a cybercriminal group which specializes in deploying ransomware. That transaction included credentials to a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) account apparently set up by a Gunnebo Group employee who wished to access the company’s internal network remotely.

Five months later, Gunnebo disclosed it had suffered a cyber attack targeting its IT systems that forced the shutdown of internal servers. Nevertheless, the company said its quick reaction prevented the intruders from spreading the ransomware throughout its systems, and that the overall lasting impact from the incident was minimal.

Earlier this week, Swedish news agency Dagens Nyheter confirmed that hackers recently published online at least 38,000 documents stolen from Gunnebo’s network. Linus Larsson, the journalist who broke the story, says the hacked material was uploaded to a public server during the second half of September, and it is not known how many people may have gained access to it.

Larsson quotes Gunnebo CEO Stefan Syrén saying the company never considered paying the ransom the attackers demanded in exchange for not publishing its internal documents. What’s more, Syrén seemed to downplay the severity of the exposure.

“I understand that you can see drawings as sensitive, but we do not consider them as sensitive automatically,” the CEO reportedly said. “When it comes to cameras in a public environment, for example, half the point is that they should be visible, therefore a drawing with camera placements in itself is not very sensitive.”

It remains unclear whether the stolen RDP credentials were a factor in this incident. But the password to the Gunnebo RDP account — “password01” — suggests the security of its IT systems may have been lacking in other areas as well.

After this author posted a request for contact from Gunnebo on Twitter, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Rasmus Jansson, an account manager at Gunnebo who specializes in protecting client systems from electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks or disruption, short bursts of energy that can damage electrical equipment.

Jansson said he relayed the stolen credentials to the company’s IT specialists, but that he does not know what actions the company took in response. Reached by phone today, Jansson said he quit the company in August, right around the time Gunnebo disclosed the thwarted ransomware attack. He declined to comment on the particulars of the extortion incident.

Ransomware attackers often spend weeks or months inside of a target’s network before attempting to deploy malware across the network that encrypts servers and desktop systems unless and until a ransom demand is met.

That’s because gaining the initial foothold is rarely the difficult part of the attack. In fact, many ransomware groups now have such an embarrassment of riches in this regard that they’ve taken to hiring external penetration testers to carry out the grunt work of escalating that initial foothold into complete control over the victim’s network and any data backup systems  — a process that can be hugely time consuming.

But prior to launching their ransomware, it has become common practice for these extortionists to offload as much sensitive and proprietary data as possible. In some cases, this allows the intruders to profit even if their malware somehow fails to do its job. In other instances, victims are asked to pay two extortion demands: One for a digital key to unlock encrypted systems, and another in exchange for a promise not to publish, auction or otherwise trade any stolen data.

While it may seem ironic when a physical security firm ends up having all of its secrets published online, the reality is that some of the biggest targets of ransomware groups continue to be companies which may not consider cybersecurity or information systems as their primary concern or business — regardless of how much may be riding on that technology.

Indeed, companies that persist in viewing cyber and physical security as somehow separate seem to be among the favorite targets of ransomware actors. Last week, a Russian journalist published a video on Youtube claiming to be an interview with the cybercriminals behind the REvil/Sodinokibi ransomware strain, which is the handiwork of a particularly aggressive criminal group that’s been behind some of the biggest and most costly ransom attacks in recent years.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=ZyQCQ1VZp8s

In the video, the REvil representative stated that the most desirable targets for the group were agriculture companies, manufacturers, insurance firms, and law firms. The REvil actor claimed that on average roughly one in three of its victims agrees to pay an extortion fee.

Mark Arena, CEO of cybersecurity threat intelligence firm Intel 471, said while it might be tempting to believe that firms which specialize in information security typically have better cybersecurity practices than physical security firms, few organizations have a deep understanding of their adversaries. Intel 471 has published an analysis of the video here.

Arena said this is a particularly acute shortcoming with many managed service providers (MSPs), companies that provide outsourced security services to hundreds or thousands of clients who might not otherwise be able to afford to hire cybersecurity professionals.

“The harsh and unfortunate reality is the security of a number of security companies is shit,” Arena said. “Most companies tend to have a lack of ongoing and up to date understanding of the threat actors they face.”

This Service Helps Malware Authors Fix Flaws in their Code

Almost daily now there is news about flaws in commercial software that lead to computers getting hacked and seeded with malware. But the reality is most malicious software also has its share of security holes that open the door for security researchers or ne’er-do-wells to liberate or else seize control over already-hacked systems. Here’s a look at one long-lived malware vulnerability testing service that is used and run by some of the Dark Web’s top cybercriminals.

It is not uncommon for crooks who sell malware-as-a-service offerings such as trojan horse programs and botnet control panels to include backdoors in their products that let them surreptitiously monitor the operations of their customers and siphon data stolen from victims. More commonly, however, the people writing malware simply make coding mistakes that render their creations vulnerable to compromise.

At the same time, security companies are constantly scouring malware code for vulnerabilities that might allow them peer to inside the operations of crime networks, or to wrest control over those operations from the bad guys. There aren’t a lot of public examples of this anti-malware activity, in part because it wades into legally murky waters. More importantly, talking publicly about these flaws tends to be the fastest way to get malware authors to fix any vulnerabilities in their code.

Enter malware testing services like the one operated by “RedBear,” the administrator of a Russian-language security site called Krober[.]biz, which frequently blogs about security weaknesses in popular malware tools.

For the most part, the vulnerabilities detailed by Krober aren’t written about until they are patched by the malware’s author, who’s paid a small fee in advance for a code review that promises to unmask any backdoors and/or harden the security of the customer’s product.

RedBear’s profile on the Russian-language xss[.]is cybercrime forum.

RedBear’s service is marketed not only to malware creators, but to people who rent or buy malicious software and services from other cybercriminals. A chief selling point of this service is that, crooks being crooks, you simply can’t trust them to be completely honest.

“We can examine your (or not exactly your) PHP code for vulnerabilities and backdoors,” reads his offering on several prominent Russian cybercrime forums. “Possible options include, for example, bot admin panels, code injection panels, shell control panels, payment card sniffers, traffic direction services, exchange services, spamming software, doorway generators, and scam pages, etc.”

As proof of his service’s effectiveness, RedBear points to almost a dozen articles on Krober[.]biz which explain in intricate detail flaws found in high-profile malware tools whose authors have used his service in the past, including; the Black Energy DDoS bot administration panel; malware loading panels tied to the Smoke and Andromeda bot loaders; the RMS and Spyadmin trojans; and a popular loan scan script.

ESTRANGED BEDFELLOWS

RedBear doesn’t operate this service on his own. Over the years he’s had several partners in the project, including two very high-profile cybercriminals (or possibly just one, as we’ll see in a moment) who until recently operated under the hacker aliases “upO” and “Lebron.”

From 2013 to 2016, upO was a major player on Exploit[.]in — one of the most active and venerated Russian-language cybercrime forums in the underground — authoring almost 1,500 posts on the forum and starting roughly 80 threads, mostly focusing on malware. For roughly one year beginning in 2016, Lebron was a top moderator on Exploit.

One of many articles Lebron published on Krober[.]biz that detailed flaws found in malware submitted to RedBear’s vulnerability testing service.

In 2016, several members began accusing upO of stealing source code from malware projects under review, and then allegedly using or incorporating bits of the code into malware projects he marketed to others.

up0 would eventually be banned from Exploit for getting into an argument with another top forum contributor, wherein both accused the other of working for or with Russian and/or Ukrainian federal authorities, and proceeded to publish personal information about the other that allegedly outed their real-life identities.

The cybercrime actor “upO” on Exploit[.]in in late 2016, complaining that RedBear was refusing to pay a debt owed to him.

Lebron first appeared on Exploit in September 2016, roughly two months before upO was banished from the community. After serving almost a year on the forum while authoring hundreds of posts and threads (including many articles first published on Krober), Lebron abruptly disappeared from Exploit.

His departure was prefaced by a series of increasingly brazen accusations by forum members that Lebron was simply upO using a different nickname. His final post on Exploit in May 2017 somewhat jokingly indicated he was joining an upstart ransomware affiliate program.

RANSOMWARE DREAMS

According to research from cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, upO had a strong interest in ransomware and had partnered with the developer of the Cerber ransomware strain, an affiliate program operating between Feb. 2016 and July 2017 that sought to corner the increasingly lucrative and competitive market for ransomware-as-a-service offerings.

Intel 471 says a rumor has been circulating on Exploit and other forums upO frequented that he was the mastermind behind GandCrab, another ransomware-as-a-service affiliate program that first surfaced in January 2018 and later bragged about extorting billions of dollars from hacked businesses when it closed up shop in June 2019.

Multiple security companies and researchers (including this author) have concluded that GandCrab didn’t exactly go away, but instead re-branded to form a more exclusive ransomware-as-a-service offering dubbed “REvil” (a.k.a. “Sodin” and “Sodinokibi”). REvil was first spotted in April 2019 after being installed by a GandCrab update, but its affiliate program didn’t kick into high gear until July 2019.

Last month, the public face of the REvil ransomware affiliate program — a cybercriminal who registered on Exploit in July 2019 using the nickname “UNKN” (a.k.a. “Unknown”) — found himself the target of a blackmail scheme publicly announced by a fellow forum member who claimed to have helped bankroll UNKN’s ransomware business back in 2016 but who’d taken a break from the forum on account of problems with the law.

That individual, using the nickname “Vivalamuerte,” said UNKN still owed him his up-front investment money, which he reckoned amounted to roughly $190,000. Vivalamuerte said he would release personal details revealing UNKN’s real-life identity unless he was paid what he claims he is owed.

In this Google-translated blackmail post by Vivalamuerte to UNKN, the latter’s former nickname was abbreviated to “L”.

Vivalamuerte also claimed UNKN has used four different nicknames, and that the moniker he interacted with back in 2016 began with the letter “L.” The accused’s full nickname was likely redacted by forum administrators because a search on the forum for “Lebron” brings up the same post even though it is not visible in any of Vivalamuerte’s threatening messages.

Reached by KrebsOnSecurity, Vivalamuerte declined to share what he knew about UNKN, saying the matter was still in arbitration. But he said he has proof that Lebron was the principle coder behind the GandCrab ransomware, and that the person behind the Lebron identity plays a central role in the REvil ransomware extortion enterprise as it exists today.

Ransomware at IT Services Provider Synoptek

Synoptek, a California business that provides cloud hosting and IT management services to more than a thousand customers nationwide, suffered a ransomware attack this week that has disrupted operations for many of its clients, according to sources. The company has reportedly paid a ransom demand in a bid to restore operations as quickly as possible.

Irvine, Calif.-based Synoptek is a managed service provider that maintains a variety of cloud-based services for more than 1,100 customers across a broad spectrum of industries, including state and local governments, financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, media, retail and software. The company has nearly a thousand employees and brought in more than $100 million in revenue in the past year, according to their Web site.

A now-deleted Tweet from Synoptek on Dec. 20 warned against the dangers of phishing-based cyberattacks, less than three days prior to their (apparently phishing-based) Sodinokibi ransomware infestation.

News of the incident first surfaced on Reddit, which lit up on Christmas Eve with posts from people working at companies affected by the outage. The only official statement about any kind of incident came late Friday evening from the company’s Twitter page, which said that on Dec. 23 it experienced a “credential compromise which has been contained,” and that Synoptek “took immediate action and have been working diligently with customers to remediate the situation.”

Synoptek has not yet responded to multiple requests for comment. But two sources who work at the company have now confirmed their employer was hit by Sodinokibi, a potent ransomware strain also known as “rEvil” that encrypts data and demands a cryptocurrency payment in return for a digital key that unlocks access to infected systems. Those sources also say the company paid their extortionists an unverified sum in exchange for decryption keys.

Sources also confirm that both the State of California and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have been reaching out to state and local entities potentially affected by the attack. One Synoptek customer briefed on the attack who asked to remain anonymous said that once inside Synoptek’s systems, the intruders used a remote management tool to install the ransomware on client systems.

Much like other ransomware gangs operating today, the crooks behind Sodiniokibi seem to focus on targeting IT providers. And it’s not hard to see why: With each passing day of an attack, customers affected by it vent their anger and frustration on social media, which places increased pressure on the provider to simply pay up.

A Sodinokibi attack earlier this month on Colorado-based IT services firm Complete Technology Solutions resulted in ransomware being installed on computers at more than 100 dentistry practices that relied on the company. In August, Wisconsin-based IT provider PerCSoft was hit by Sodinokibi, causing outages for more than 400 clients.

To put added pressure on victims to negotiate payment, the purveyors of Sodinokibi recently stated that they plan to publish data stolen from companies infected with their malware who elect to rebuild their operations instead of paying the ransom.

In addition, the group behind the Maze Ransomware malware strain recently began following through on a similar threat, erecting a site on the public Internet that lists victims by name and includes samples of sensitive documents stolen from victims who have opted not to pay. When the site was first set up on Dec. 14, it listed just eight victims; as of today, there are more than two dozen companies named.

Ransomware Gangs Now Outing Victim Businesses That Don’t Pay Up

As if the scourge of ransomware wasn’t bad enough already: Several prominent purveyors of ransomware have signaled they plan to start publishing data stolen from victims who refuse to pay up. To make matters worse, one ransomware gang has now created a public Web site identifying recent victim companies that have chosen to rebuild their operations instead of quietly acquiescing to their tormentors.

The message displayed at the top of the Maze Ransomware public shaming site.

Less than 48 hours ago, the cybercriminals behind the Maze Ransomware strain erected a Web site on the public Internet, and it currently lists the company names and corresponding Web sites for eight victims of their malware that have declined to pay a ransom demand.

“Represented here companies dont wish to cooperate with us, and trying to hide our successful attack on their resources,” the site explains in broken English. “Wait for their databases and private papers here. Follow the news!”

KrebsOnSecurity was able to verify that at least one of the companies listed on the site indeed recently suffered from a Maze ransomware infestation that has not yet been reported in the news media.

The information disclosed for each Maze victim includes the initial date of infection, several stolen Microsoft Office, text and PDF files, the total volume of files allegedly exfiltrated from victims (measured in Gigabytes), as well as the IP addresses and machine names of the servers infected by Maze.

As shocking as this new development may be to some, it’s not like the bad guys haven’t warned us this was coming.

“For years, ransomware developers and affiliates have been telling victims that they must pay the ransom or stolen data would be publicly released,” said Lawrence Abrams, founder of the computer security blog and victim assistance site BleepingComputer.com. “While it has been a well-known secret that ransomware actors snoop through victim’s data, and in many cases steal it before the data is encrypted, they never actually carried out their threats of releasing it.”

Abrams said that changed at the end of last month, when the crooks behind Maze Ransomware threatened Allied Universal that if they did not pay the ransom, they would release their files. When they did not receive a payment, they released 700MB worth of data on a hacking forum.

“Ransomware attacks are now data breaches,” Abrams said. “During ransomware attacks, some threat actors have told companies that they are familiar with internal company secrets after reading the company’s files. Even though this should be considered a data breach, many ransomware victims simply swept it under the rug in the hopes that nobody would ever find out. Now that ransomware operators are releasing victim’s data, this will need to change and companies will have to treat these attacks like data breaches.”

The move by Maze Ransomware comes just days after the cybercriminals responsible for managing the “Sodinokibi/rEvil” ransomware empire posted on a popular dark Web forum that they also plan to start using stolen files and data as public leverage to get victims to pay ransoms.

The leader of the Sodinokibi/rEvil ransomware gang promising to name and shame victims publicly in a recent cybercrime forum post. Image: BleepingComputer.

This is especially ghastly news for companies that may already face steep fines and other penalties for failing to report breaches and safeguard their customers’ data. For example, healthcare providers are required to report ransomware incidents to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which often documents breaches involving lost or stolen healthcare data on its own site.

While these victims may be able to avoid reporting ransomware incidents if they can show forensic evidence demonstrating that patient data was never taken or accessed, sites like the one that Maze Ransomware has now erected could soon dramatically complicate these incidents.

Ransomware at Colorado IT Provider Affects 100+ Dental Offices

A Colorado company that specializes in providing IT services to dental offices suffered a ransomware attack this week that is disrupting operations for more than 100 dentistry practices, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

Multiple sources affected say their IT provider, Englewood, Colo. based Complete Technology Solutions (CTS), was hacked, allowing a potent strain of ransomware known as “Sodinokibi” or “rEvil” to be installed on computers at more than 100 dentistry businesses that rely on the company for a range of services — including network security, data backup and voice-over-IP phone service.

Reached via phone Friday evening, CTS President Herb Miner declined to answer questions about the incident. When asked about reports of a ransomware attack on his company, Miner simply said it was not a good time and hung up.

The attack on CTS comes little more than two months after Sodinokibi hit Wisconsin-based dental IT provider PerCSoft, an intrusion that encrypted files for approximately 400 dental practices.

Thomas Terronez, CEO of Iowa-based Medix Dental, said he’s heard from several affected practices that the attackers are demanding $700,000 in bitcoin from some of the larger victims to receive a key that can unlock files encrypted by the ransomware.

Others reported a ransom demand in the tens of thousands of dollars. In previous ransomware attacks, the assailants appear to have priced their ransom demands based on the number of workstation and/or server endpoints within the victim organization. According to CTS, its clients typically have anywhere from 10 to 100 workstations.

Terronez said he’s spoken with multiple practices that have been sidelined by the ransomware attack, and that some CTS clients had usable backups of their data available off-site, while others have been working with third party companies to independently negotiate and pay the ransom for their practice only.

Many of CTS’s customers took to posting about the attack on a private Facebook group for dentists, discussing steps they’ve taken or attempted to take to get their files back.

“I would recommend everyone reach out to their insurance provider,” said one dentist based in Denver. “I was told by CTS that I would have to pay the ransom to get my corrupted files back.”

“My experience has been very different,” said dental practitioner based in Las Vegas. “No help from my insurance. Still not working, great loss of income, patients are mad, staff even worse.”

Terronez said the dental industry in general has fairly atrocious security practices, and that relatively few offices are willing to spend what’s needed to fend off sophisticated attackers. He said it’s common to see servers that haven’t been patched for over a year, backups that haven’t run for a while, Windows Defender as only point of detection, non-segmented wireless networks, and the whole staff having administrator access to the computers — sometimes all using the same or simple passwords.

“A lot of these [practices] are forced into a price point on what they’re willing to spend,” said Terronez, whose company also offers IT services to dental providers. “The most important thing for these offices is how fast can you solve their problems, and not necessarily the security stuff behind the scenes until it really matters.”