Mobile voting: Hype or reality?
The 2020 United States presidential election is already off to a rocky start. We’ve seen technology fail in the primary elections, in-person campaigning halted, and a plethora of mixed messages on how voting will actually take place. Many Americans are still uncertain where or how they will vote in November – or worse, they’re unsure if their vote will be tabulated correctly.
For most of us, voting by anything other than a paper ballot or a voting machine is a foreign concept. Due to the pandemic and shelter in place restrictions, various alternatives have been considered this year — in particular, voting via our mobile devices.
On paper, it might seem like COVID-19 has created the ideal opportunity to introduce voting options that utilize the millions of mobile phones and tablets in U.S. voters’ hands. The reality is, our country is not ready to utilize this technology in a safe and protected way.
Here are the four things holding back mobile voting:
Testing and scalability
If we have learned anything from the Iowa Caucus app failure, it is that testing for scalability is key. Prior to Election Day, we must confirm that every voter will be able to vote from their mobile device from any location, all at the same time, without the system crashing.
This is no small feat: newly deployed code almost always has faults, and if a voting app has not undergone rigorous testing at scale by now (less than 75 days from Election Day), it is highly unlikely that it could be sufficiently tested and distributed in time.
Verification and secret ballots
Tying an identity to a user and phone negates the concept of an anonymized ballot, something we’re entitled to as eligible voters. If the vote is cast via a mobile device — especially if there is some way of reconciling the paper ballot back to the electronic vote — then there has to be an identity key that is used to correlate them.
Verifying the identity of the voter and their device and doing it in a way that also allows for secret ballots is a critical challenge to overcome if mobile voting is ever to become a reality.
Even if the kinks in mobile voting are worked out, how can we ensure overall trust in the system? Not only do we need to trust that our vote was cast, but that it was cast in a way that is private, secure, and for the person it was intended. If there is no reconciliation with the paper ballot, how are any risk-limiting audits conducted? Without an auditable system, it is impossible to win the trust of the electorate, which is an absolute necessity ahead of a process as integral to our country as voting.
QR code risks
Chances are, voters would be directed to a voting website via a QR code. While the reliance on distributed ledger technology — even with a cryptographic signature that is highly resistant to alteration — provides a strong method of recording and tabulating votes, it is still not cyber-invincible.
QR codes are not “readable” by humans. Therefore, the ability to alter a QR code to point to an alternative resource without being detected is simple and highly effective. The target of the QR code could result in compromise of credentials, phishing, and malicious code downloads.
Most significantly in this scenario, the QR code could redirect the voter to a site where their vote is captured, altered, returned to the device or forwarded on to the actual site, and when the voter signs the affidavit and submits their vote, it may or may not be for who they actually intended to vote.
Ultimately, the most important thing we can do this election is vote — vote by mail, vote in person, vote early, and vote in a way that you can be sure your vote will be counted for the candidate for whom you intended to vote. However, the idea that we’ll be able to safely via our mobile devices — at least this time around — is nothing but a pipe dream. Until we work out the security and privacy concerns associated with mobile voting, we’re going to have to stick to traditional methods.